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WHEN THE BOMBS DROP 
Reactions to Disconfirmed Prophecy 
in a Millennial Sect 
ROBERT W. BALCH 
GWEN FARNSWORTH 
SUE WILKINS 
University of Montana 
This article reports the results of an ethnographic study of a millennial 
Baha'i sect whose leader predicted that the world would be devastated 
by nuclear war on April 29, 1980. Shortly before that date we began a 
participant-observer study of the sect, and during the following eight 
months we supplemented our observations by interviewing members and 
defectors in the four states where the group's leader had a substantial 
following. The purpose of the investigation was to replicate the classic 
study of disconfirmed prophecy reported in When Prophecy Fails by 
Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter. They found that prophetic disconfir- 
mation was followed by an increase in conviction and heightened efforts 
to recruit new believers. We report contrary findings and explore social 
psychological factors that might account for the difference between our 
findings and the results of the Festinger et al. study. We argue that reac- 
tions to prophetic failure are shaped less by psychological forces than by 
social circumstances existing at the time of disconfirmation. 
On April 29, 1980, members of a small Baha'i sect' entered fallout 
shelters to await a thermonuclear war that would fulfill the pro- 
phecies of Revelation. In exactly one hour they believed one-third 
of mankind would perish in the holocaust. During the next 20 
years they expected the world to be further avaged by starvation 
and disease, worldwide revolution, and natural disasters caused 
by the Earth's shifting crust. Finally, in the year 2000, God's 
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Kingdom would be established on Earth and a thousand years 
of peace would ensue. 
About one month before April 29 we began a participant- 
observer study of this group. Although the project has become 
an ongoing affair, our original intent was to replicate the classic 
study by Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter (1956) of the reactions 
to disconfirmed prophecy. Festinger and his colleagues infiltrated 
a millennial flying saucer cult to test the hypothesis that discon- 
firmation of the leader's prophecy would result in increased con- 
viction and heightened efforts to recruit new believers. They argued 
that members of apocalyptic groups experience severe cognitive 
dissonance when their prophecies fail. If believers have made 
strong commitments based on their faith, they cannot easily aban- 
don their beliefs. Instead, their only recourse is to seek conso- 
nant information, including the social support of fellow believers, 
and that should entail increased efforts to persuade nonbelievers 
to accept the faith. 
Festinger et al. tested their hypothesis by observing the reac- 
tions of a millennial cult (the Lake City group) when the expected 
catastrophe failed to happen. The group's leader, a woman they 
called Marian Keech, had received several messages from a space 
being named Sananda warning her about a devastating flood that 
would inundate much of North America on a particular date. Even 
after her prophecy failed, the most committed members main- 
tained their beliefs. Mrs. Keech claimed that the world had been 
saved by their faith, and she pointed to earthquakes in other parts 
of the globe to prove that disastrous upheavals had really occurred, 
although not in the manner she expected. She also made several 
more predictions in rapid succession, all disconfirmed, in what 
appeared to be a desperate attempt o save face. Most important, 
she and her followers began to proselyte almost immediately -a 
finding that is especially remarkable in view of the fact that Mrs. 
Keech had been relatively unconcerned about spreading Sananda's 
messages prior to the disconfirmation. 
However, a subsequent study of a millennial Christian sect 
called the Church of the True Word failed to support the pros- 
elyting hypothesis. Hardyck and Braden (1962) found that Church 
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members did not attempt o win new converts after an expected 
nuclear attack failed to occur. Out of 135 believers who entered 
fallout shelters, 103 remained underground for 42 days until Mrs. 
Shepard, their prophet, told them to come out. Testimonies and 
follow-up interviews indicated that they remained firm in their 
beliefs. Members claimed that God had merely been testing their 
faith and using them as an example to warn an apathetic world. 
Mrs. Shepard's followers continued to believe that war was immi- 
nent, but they made no efforts to proselyte after they emerged 
from their shelters, even though they had numerous opportunities 
to do so. 
Consequently, the evidence concerning the urge to proselyte 
after prophetic failure is contradictory. Hardyck and Braden sug- 
gested that Festinger et al. failed to specify all the conditions under 
which proselyting will occur. Here we attempt o build on their 
conclusion by arguing that reactions to disconfirmed prophecy 
depend on the social context in which disconfirmation is exper- 
ienced. Because adaptation to prophetic failure is a collective 
process (Zygmunt, 1972), any theory that neglects the role of inter- 
actional variables will have limited value in explaining how millen- 
nial movements react when their prophecies fail. 
DATA COLLECTION 
Unfortunately, most accounts of millennial movements do not 
provide much information about group dynamics at the moment 
of disconfirmation. The best way to get this information is to 
be on the scene when prophetic failure occurs, but outsiders rarely 
have that opportunity. They must rely on after-the-fact in erviews, 
as Hardyck and Braden did, or historical records, which are often 
unreliable or incomplete. Like Festinger et al., however, we were 
lucky enough to witness firsthand the moment of truth. 
We first heard about the apocalyptic sect known as the Baha'is 
Under the Provisions of the Covenant (BUPC) about two months 
before the impending cataclysm.2 The little-known sect based in 
Missoula, Montana, was catapulted into the headlines when the 
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local paper exposed a nuclear preparedness group as a BUPC 
organization. Known as SAFE, standing for Shelter and Fall-Out 
Education, the group has been organized by the BUPC to upgrade 
Missoula's fallout shelters and educate Missoulians about nuclear 
survival. 
With the permission of the sect's leader, Dr. Leland Jensen 
(known as "Doc" to his followers), we began participating in all 
manner of BUPC activities. These included "feasts" held every 
19 days according to the Baha'i calendar, "firesides" where the 
BUPC teach the faith to "prospective members," and "deepenings" 
intended to explore Baha'i writings in greater depth. In the hec- 
tic days before April 29 we spent long hours collating pages for 
Doc's latest manuscript (Jensen, 1980) and helping members 
prepare their fallout shelters. When the fateful day finally arrived, 
we joined believers in three different underground shelters, and 
we returned on May 7 after Doc reset the date for the catastrophe. 
During the next six months we interviewed 41 of Doc's followers, 
including believers in Wyoming, Colorado, and Arkansas. In 
addition to these formal contacts, we have spent a considerable 
amount of time with the BUPC in more casual settings. 
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE 
BAHA'IS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE COVENENT 
Any discussion of the BUPC must begin with Doc, the jovial 
67-year-old chiropractor who predicted the cataclysm for April 
29. Once an internationally known Baha'i teacher, Doc was 
expelled from Baha'i Faith in 1960 for aligning himself with a 
schismatic leader named Mason Remey. Believing that a 
catastrophic flood was about to inundate much of the United 
States, Mason urged his followers to move to high ground in the 
Rocky Mountains, and in 1964 Doc opened a chiropractic office 
in Missoula. Because of opposition within Mason's following 
stemming from a 1963 doctrinal dispute, he became discouraged 
with the human side of the faith and stopped teaching altogether 
shortly after moving to Montana. 
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In 1969 Doc was convicted of performing a "lewd and lascivious 
act" on a 15-year-old patient, and despite his claims of a frame- 
up, he was sentenced to 20 years in the state penitentiary. Not 
long after his arrival, Doc says he was visited in his cell by an 
angel who informed him of his spiritual identity. Drawing on a 
remarkable set of parallels between events in his life and certain 
Biblical prophecies, Doc issued a proclamation in 1971 claiming 
to be Joshua, the high priest prophesied in Zechariah 3. According 
to Doc, Joshua is the return of Jesus who will establish the 
Kingdom after the holocaust. Eventually Doc claimed several other 
Biblical identities, including the Lamb and the Seventh Angel 
described in Revelation. 
Once the angel lifted the veil from his eyes, Doc was able to 
comprehend the symbolism of the Scriptures. He began tying 
together diverse strands of Biblical prophecy, Baha'i teachings, 
and pyramidology, a fascination dating from his childhood. All 
the evidence pointed to the same inescapable conclusion that 
nuclear catastrophe was imminent. As early as 1971 Doc predicted 
that the war would begin in 1980, caused by a conflict between 
the superpowers over Middle East oil. After the four waves of 
destruction (Revelation 7:1) had cleansed the world of evil and 
apostasy, Doc believed that the remainder of mankind would 
embrace the BUPC faith and peace and harmony would prevail 
for the next thousand years. 
Shortly after his visitation, Doc began holding firesides for his 
fellow inmates. Twice a week 20 to 30 attended his meetings, and 
by the time he was paroled in 1973 Doc had recruited a small group 
of highly committed believers. Some of his converts became effec- 
tive teachers in their own right. One of Doc's first recruits was 
largely responsible for establishing a branch of the faith in 
Sheridan, Wyoming, where about 15 people eventually became 
followers. 
After his release Doc began spreading his message outside the 
prison walls. In 1978 he took an extended trip throughout he 
midwestern and Rocky Mountain states trying to convert many 
of Mason Remey's followers, and his efforts led to the establish- 
ment of small BUPC groups in Durango, Colorado and Ft. Smith, 
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Arkansas. It is impossible to say how many believers there were 
on the eve of April 29, 1980, but roughly 150 people in Montana, 
Wyoming, Colorado, and Arkansas made plans to enter fallout 
shelters "when the bombs dropped" (one of Doc's favorite 
expressions).3 
Prior to April 29 the BUPC were a recruitment-oriented group 
whose lives revolved around teaching the faith. Teaching was 
expected and Doc claimed that proselyting would be rewarded 
with a high station in God's kingdom. To that end the BUPC 
organized the Communications Club, a group modeled after 
Toastmasters, to improve public speaking skills, and they com- 
piled a "teacher's manual" explaining how to teach the faith to 
nonbelievers. Recruitment proceeded almost entirely through 
friendship networks and family ties (Stark and Bainbridge, 1980). 
Persons interested in learning about the faith were invited to a 
series of firesides, usually held in a member's home, where they 
were systematically introduced to Doc's teachings as well as the 
basic principles of the Baha'i faith. Although we have no, reliable 
figures, it appears that most of those who completed the fireside 
sequence became believers. 
In 1979 Doc determined that the bombs would drop at precisely 
5:55 p.m. Mountain Daylight Time. As the date approached, his 
followers tepped up their efforts to prepare for the holocaust. 
Their most ambitious undertaking was SAFE. Recognizing that 
the organization might be discredited if it became identified with 
a group of "religious fanatics," they preferred to keep its con- 
nection with Doc a secret. Under the auspices of SAFE members 
taught classes on shelter management and radiological monitoring, 
and they printed thousands of leaflets explaining what to do in 
the event of a nuclear attack. 
SAFE disbanded after it was exposed as a BUPC project, and 
because of lack of public support, its members abandoned their 
plans to improve the community's shelters. With the date less than 
two months away, even teaching the faith diminished as Doc's 
followers turned their energies to building and stocking their 
private shelters. There were eight in the Missoula area, including 
a ''community shelter" for members who could not afford their 
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own. The major focus of group activity during the last month 
was the print shop. Doc owned a small printing business that 
printed commercial work by day and Doc's manuscripts by night. 
Day after day the BUPC assembled pages until 2:00 or 3:00 a.m. 
in a frantic effort o publish 10,000 copies of Doc's latest book 
before April 29. 
Meanwhile, the public was at least vaguely aware that the 
Baha'is were preparing for Armageddon. Doc received con- 
siderable local newspaper and TV coverage, and the Associated 
Press carried several stories about his predictions. Although 
members occasionally complained about media bias, they gen- 
erally believed the coverage was fair. In Missoula there was some 
ridicule in the form of jokes on the radio, impromptu doomsday 
parties, and a few crank calls to believers, but overall the atmo- 
sphere could best be described as indifferent. 
Finally, on the night of April 28, about 80 believers met at a 
potluck feast in Missoula for the last time before Armageddon. 
They joked and laughed and enjoyed their meal as if nothing 
unusual were about to happen. Were it not for the speeches that 
followed, an outsider would not have guessed that these cheerful 
people were expecting nuclear warheads to strike within 24 hours. 
The festivities concluded around 10:00 p.m. and then the faithful 
dispersed to their espective shelters to await the missiles that would 
usher in the new age. 
SUITABILITY OF THE BAHA'I SECT 
FOR TESTING THE FESTINGER HYPOTHESIS 
Festinger et al. specified five conditions that must be met before 
prophetic failure can be expected to be followed by increased con- 
viction and vigorous proselyting. According to the first, a belief 
must be held with deep conviction and it must have some relevance 
for action. Although the BUPC included many fringe members 
who were skeptical about Doc's prediction, the vast majority took 
it very seriously. Only a few expressed doubts to any of us, and 
interviews with ex-members who left the group before April 29 
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confirm our impression that the level of belief was very high. Doc's 
prediction obviously had direct implications for their behavior. 
Even true believers would perish if they did not prepare for the 
holocaust, and the fact that they made extensive preparations is 
strong evidence that members expected the bombs to drop on 
April 29. 
The second condition is closely tied to the first. Believers must 
make irreversible commitments based on their conviction. Doc 
was so confident hat he staked the validity of all his teachings 
on the accuracy of his prediction. For example, in a small book 
entitled The Most Mighty Document (1979: 61-62) he posed the 
following question: 
DOES YOUR RELIGION (sect or denomination) tell you the 
"Day and the Hour" for the oncoming thermo-nuclear holocaust 
in which a third of mankind are to be killed, so that you can be 
100 miles from a thermo-nuclear blast (Rev. 14:20)? If it doesn't 
it lacks Divine Guidance to save you [italics in original]. 
There is no doubt most believers made enormous commitments. 
They organized SAFE to alert the community to the dangers of 
radioactive fallout, and they built their own shelters at great 
expense, often running up huge bills which they had trouble paying 
after the 29th. Virtually all of them attempted to persuade friends 
and relatives to accept the faith or at least take precautions. Some 
wrote to the local paper explaining their beliefs; a few wrote 
pamphlets about the faith, which Doc printed and distributed 
along with his own manuscripts. Many believers had moved to 
Missoula, in some cases from almost 2000 miles away, just to be 
near Doc when the war began. 
The third condition is that the prediction must be sufficiently 
specific to be refuted unequivocally. By specifying that the bombs 
would drop at precisely 5:55 p.m. Mountain Daylight Time on 
April 29, 1980, Doc clearly left no room for hedging. 
The fourth condition requires undeniable evidence that the 
predicted events did not occur. This, too, was quite clear. No 
bombs fell on April 29; Doc's followers were well aware that the 
day passed without incident. 
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Finally, there must be social support for the apocalyptic belief. 
Festinger et al. added this provision because they felt that believers 
would be unable to withstand the devasting impact of disconfir- 
mation if they did not have at least some degree of support from 
others. The BUPC met this condition as well. They were a close- 
knit group, bound by a single undisputed leader, a shared set of 
beliefs, family and friendship ties, and regular social interaction. 
The believers referred to themselves as "the friends" or "the com- 
munity," and some compared themselves to an extended family, 
an analogy that we found quite appropriate. The sect consistituted 
a relatively exclusive social world where close ties with nonbelievers 
were unusual. 
In short, the BUPC met all five conditions pecified by Festinger 
et al. How well, then, did their behavior following April 29 con- 
form to the hypothesis that conviction and recruitment efforts 
would increase after disconfirmation? 
REACTIONS TO DISCONFIRMATION 
Contrary to the hypothesis, the failure of Doc's prediction did 
not strengthen the believers' convictions, nor did it produce an 
increase in proselyting. In fact, just the opposite occurred. It took 
several months before some members would admit to us just how 
badly shaken they had been when the bombs did not drop on 
April 29. 
Although reactions varied from shelter to shelter, most believers 
at first appeared relatively unconcerned, as if the 29th had not 
been an important event. Events in the community shelter pro- 
vide a good example. The appointed time appeared to pass 
unnoticed even though there had been a high degree of tension 
earlier in the day. Members continued to work on last-minute pro- 
jects, but the atmosphere became increasingly subdued as 5:55 
approached and passed without incident. Since the shelter door 
still was not securely in place, it was easy for believers to slip out 
quietly, and many took advantage of the opportunity. Those who 
remained said little. Around 8:30 p.m. a large group, including 
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the senior author, went out for dinner at a nearby restaurant. No 
one seemed concerned about the possibility that Doc's predic- 
tion might have been off by a few hours. In fact, no one said 
anything about the bombs. Much of the meal was spent in silence 
broken only by occasional small talk. Back in the shelter they 
watched television or read quietly, saying almost nothing until 
12:15 a.m., when the shelter manager casually asked a small group 
of believers what they thought about the unexpected turn of events. 
However, there was little discussion, and by 1:00 a.m. the lights 
were out and the shelter was completely silent. 
The next few days were undoubtedly the most anomic the BUPC 
had ever experienced. The situation could best be described as 
an informational vacuum. Doc's followers were scattered over four 
states, and even in the Missoula area there were several shelters, 
three of them about 30 miles out of town. Members were even 
more widely dispersed than this implies because many stayed at 
home on the assumption that they would have about eight hours 
to seek shelter before the fallout arrived from West Coast target 
areas like Portland and Seattle. Although their shelters were equip- 
ped with CB radios, Doc had not bothered to make specific plans 
for keeping in contact with his followers, nor had he specified 
any particular length of time that members should remain 
underground. He merely assumed that they would need to stay 
there about two weeks. In Missoula some of the believers tayed 
for as long as three days, but most had come out by the evening 
of April 30. In the community shelter about two-thirds of those 
who had been there before 5:55 p.m. on the 29th had left by 
midnight. 
Doc's first response to disconfirmation was to reset the time 
for 6:11 a.m. on May 7. Citing a passage in Revelation, he claimed 
the reason for the delay was "to give the peoples of the world 
a chance to hear the voice of their savior and be saved, or to con- 
demn him and go into the fire." However, word of the new predic- 
tion circulated informally by word of mouth because Doc made 
no systematic effort o get the message out. In fact, the BUPC 
did not meet again as a group until May 16. 
During this period group activities topped almost completely. 
We never saw more than two or three people at the print shop, 
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and work on the community shelter was halfhearted at best. The 
shelter committee met at least twice, but most of the enthusiastic 
volunteers we had observed before April 29 had disappeared. The 
group became decidedly less visible as believers withdrew into their 
private spaces, and observation suddenly became very difficult. 
Members who had once been extremely open to us cooled 
noticeably. For example, on the senior author's first visit to the 
community shelter after the 29th, most of the believers avoided 
eye contact, gave brief, businesslike replies to questions, and 
generally acted as if he were not there. Although Doc remained 
friendly and open, we generally felt like intruders. 
By May 4 Doc had added a four-page addendum, printed in 
red, to his manuscript explaining what really happened on April 
29. Citing numerous phone calls from reporters as far away as 
Australia, he claimed to have fulfilled the prophecy of Revela- 
tion 16:17 and 18 in which the Seventh Angel pours his "bowl 
of wrath" into the air. This, he said, refers to the worldwide media 
coverage his message received on the 29th. In this addendum Doc 
also drew a parallel between himself and Noah, claiming that the 
Old Testament prophet had been similarly mistaken the first ime 
he predicted the deluge. He cited the Koran, which says that Noah 
made three predictions before the flood finally occurred, and 
Matthew 24:37, which prophsesies that "The coming of the Son 
of Man will repeat what happened in Noah's time." This explana- 
tion quickly became the most widely cited reason for the 
disconfirmation. 
While the red pages were being added to the book, Doc received 
a phone call that provided him with still another explanation for 
April 29. The caller, a formal Naval officer, claimed that the Soviet 
Union had launched a spy satellite armed with nuclear warheads 
at the precise moment Doc had predicted.4 Believing that the 
United States considered this an act of war, Doc announced that 
this action would set in motion a chain of events that would 
culminate in the holocaust, now set for May 7. 
In spite of Doc's explanation, the BUPC appeared very 
demoralized. Most members we interviewed expressed skepticism 
about Doc's account of the spy satellite, although none would 
rule it our entirely, and we rarely heard anyone mention it in casual 
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conversations. The parallel with Noah continued to be the most 
popular explanation for the disconfirmation, but some members 
who had once presented themselves to us as true believers now 
insisted that they had always been skeptical about Doc's predic- 
tion. Many of them cited Matthew 25:13, which says that no man 
knows the day or the hour when the Son of Man will return. 
The May 7 date failed to rekindle nthusiasm. Most members 
told us they did not believe the bombs would drop then, and hardly 
anyone volunteered to work in the print shop or community 
shelter. Fewer people made plans to reenter a shelter, and the com- 
munity shelter was almost empty when the date arrived. After 
the 7th also passed uneventfully Doc tried one last time, suggesting 
that the bombs might drop on either May 22 or 23, but by then 
no one (to our knowledge) believed him, and even Doc later 
admitted to us that he had been "grasping at straws." 
Within a few days after April 29 we began hearing comments 
about increasing quarrels and family problems in the group, 
including a brief fight between two members of the shelter com- 
mittee. We witnessed several flareups ourselves. Most were 
triggered by minor incidents like borrowing a tool without per- 
mission, not returning something to its proper place, or leaving 
a shelter door open. 
On May 16 the Missoula group finally gathered for their first 
feast since April 29. Normally the responsibility for feasts fell 
to Doc's followers, but this time no one volunteered, so Doc 
organized the gathering himself. Thirty-six believers attended, not 
counting Doc and his wife, and almost all of them were core 
members who had been extremely active in the faith prior to the 
29th. Superficially there was no evidence of the tension and 
demoralization we have described. The atmosphere was friendly 
and cheerful, and not once did we hear anyone mention April 
29 or the thermonuclear war, even though the third date was only 
one week away. 
After a few prayers about persecution, suffering, and standing 
fast in the faith, Doc addressed the group. Besides explaining what 
happened on April 29, he criticized his followers for bickering 
and shirking their responsibilities. Using himself as an example 
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of courage in the face of adversity, he exorted them to remain 
true to the faith, but we failed to observe any signs of enthusiasm 
during his talk. Of particular significance were Doc's comments 
on proselyting. As if even he did not think the bombs would drop 
on May 22 or 23, he declared that the war would not begin until 
the BUPC had recruited the 144,000 prophesied in Revelation. 
To help spread the message he had brought a box of his books 
and urged members to distribute copies all over town. Doc was 
more forceful about proselyting than we had ever seen him. In 
some of this strongest language he exhorted them to "Rise and 
shine! Establish the Kingdom! Teach as you never have before!" 
Despite Doc's pep talk, no one took any books and hardly any 
teaching occurred throughout the summer. To our knowledge none 
of Doc's followers was ever approached by the press, and none 
of them sought media attention. Firesides were discontinued, and 
most believers kept a low profile in town. Usually they told us 
that they did not mention the faith to anyone unless someone 
asked them about it. Even Doc's efforts at spreading the faith 
were subdued. He issued a press release, composed a lengthy letter 
to the local paper which was never published, and answered ques- 
tions from dozens of reporters who called after the 29th; but other- 
wise he did nothing to get his message out to the world. 
Attendance at feasts continued to drop over the summer until 
it hit an all-time low of 11 on September 27. The BUPC even 
missed two feast dates because, again, no one volunteered. There 
were three major reasons for the small attendance figures. First, 
some of the 80 who attended the April 29 feast were not com- 
mitted believers, but friends and relatives who knew relatively little 
about Doc and his teachings. None of these people ever returned. 
Second, several members moved out of town, ostensibly to find 
work, but often to escape what they described as an oppressive 
atmosphere within the group poisoned by internal conflict. Even 
though the BUPC strongly condemned the practice of backbiting, 
the amount of malicious gossip that circulated after the 29th was 
considerable. Doc himself contributed to the problem. For 
example, during a feast we attended, he openly questioned his 
followers about alleged drug use by three members who were 
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rumored to have joined a rival sect. The third reason for poor 
attendance at feasts is what some members characterized as "burn- 
out." They had worked feverishly and exhausted their resources 
preparing for the 29th, and now with the date postponed indef- 
initely, they preferred to return to some semblance of normalcy. 
However, the poor turnout at feasts did not reflect widespread 
defection from the faith. For our purposes defection can be 
defined as rejection of the formerly held belief that Doc is the 
"promised one" prophesied in Zechariah. Since some of those 
who made plans to enter a shelter did not even know much about 
Doc, they could hardly be classified as defectors when they failed 
to attend the feasts after April 29. If we restrict our attention to 
those who genuinely believed in Doc, two patterns become 
apparent. In the Missoula group we found only four members 
who could be classified as defectors ix months after the 29th. 
Three of them had been central figures and their defection came 
as a shock to the rest of the group. While the defectors refused 
to reject the possibility that Doc might ultimately be right, they 
each expressed serious reservations about his messianic claims. 
Otherwise, everyone in the Missoula group continued to profess 
belief in Doc, although many admitted that they occasionally 
entertained oubts. It appears that even those who failed to attend 
feasts over the summer continued to believe. On the other hand, 
almost all the believers outside Montana eventually rejected Doc's 
teachings. Everyone in the Arkansas group defected, as did most 
of the believers in Colorado and Wyoming. To our knowledge 
only three members of the Colorado group remained steadfast 
by the end of the summer, and possibly two in Wyoming.5 
During the summer we began to hear a new theme in both 
formal interviews and casual conversations with believers. The 
BUPC explained that the community had been so preoccupied 
with preparations for the war before April 29 that they had 
neglected the basic Baha'i teachings. They spoke less and less 
about Doc and his predictions and increasingly about the need 
to live their lives according to Baha'i principles. The best way to 
teach the faith, they claimed, was to become a living example for 
others. As one woman explained, "I think we all made a mistake. 
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We got too caught up in the physical. We weren't ready for the 
war because spiritually none of us were strong enough." As early 
as May 14 we noticed that hardly anyone still used the familiar 
expression, "when the bombs drop." Although they all continued 
to believe that war was inevitable, their personal predictions varied 
from "within a year" to "the turn of the century." 
We also detected a new fatalistic trend. Once obsessed with 
preparedness, many believers adopted the attitude that they would 
survive if God meant them to. They lost the community shelter 
when they could no longer pay the rent on the warehouse base- 
ment where it was located, and most of the group's private shelters, 
including Doc's, were at least partly dismantled. Only two BUPC 
in Wyoming remained active in civil defense work, but one of 
them claimed she no longer believed in Doc. 
For his part, Doc continued to revise his explanations for the 
failure of the April 29 prediction, and in a lengthy new introduc- 
tion to his book he declared that the seven-year Tribulation 
described in Revelation had commenced on the predicted date. 
Although he continued to insist that war was imminent, Doc 
claimed that the four winds of destruction (Revelation 7:1) were 
being held back until the 144,000 had been recruited. However, 
he set no new date for the catastrophe and refused to be pinned 
down even to an approximate time. 
Despite Doc's concern for teaching the faith, he dismissed his 
followers' inactivity as a temporary period of "quiescence," and 
subsequent observations of the group in 1982 have born out his 
assessment. Teaching has gradually resumed, and a few of Doc's 
new generation of believers have become energetic proselyters. 
Nevertheless, the size of Doc's active following remains small, 
and the new members generally appear far more enthusiastic about 
teaching than those who accepted the faith prior to April 29. 
DISCUSSION 
Contrary to the theory advanced by Festinger et al., we found 
no evidence of increased conviction or proselyting in the first six 
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months after disconfirmation. Instead, there is considerable 
evidence that the BUPC's faith was badly shaken by the failure 
of Doc's prediction. Defection was widespread in the out-of-state 
groups; and even in Missoula, where virtually everyone continued 
to profess belief, members resisted Doc's efforts to resume pros- 
elyting. This finding is especially devastating for the Festinger 
hypothesis because the Missoula group had a long tradition of 
active recruitment before April 29. 
In an attempt o explain why members of the True Word sect 
did not proselyte after Mrs. Shepard's prophecy was disconfirmed, 
Hardyk and Braden suggested that two additional variables need 
to be considered in order to understand a group's reaction to pro- 
phetic failure. The first is the degree of public ridicule. Accord- 
ing to Hardyk and Braden, the more a group is berated for its 
beliefs by outsiders, the more its members hould feel the need 
to justify their position by proselyting. Compared with the Lake 
City group, which was ridiculed unmercifully by pranksters and 
the local papers, the BUPC and True Word group had an easy 
time with nonbelievers. In both cases the press was generally fair 
and the public seemed indifferent to the episode. 
The second variable is the level of social support enjoyed by 
believers. While Festinger et al. argued that some degree of sup- 
port is essential to prevent defection, Hardyk and Braden con- 
tended that the consensual validation provided by a strong 
community of believers could reduce dissonance to the point where 
it would be unnecessary to recruit additional members. That is, 
the urge to proselyte following disconfirmation should be greater 
in groups providing weak support than in groups that are highly 
supportive. Marian Keech's Lake City cult was a relatively new, 
loose-knit group that lacked a well-integrated set of beliefs. For 
awhile Mrs. Keech even had to vie for leadership with another 
member who claimed to receive messages from none other than 
the Creator Himself. By contrast, the True Word sect was a highly 
cohesive group with undisputed leaders and a coherent belief 
system, so it should have provided greater social support in the 
face of disconfirmation. 
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The BUPC case is less clear-cut but still consistent with Hardyk 
and Braden's hypothesis. Although the Missoula group had been 
relatively "tight" before April 29, it was quickly splintered by 
gossip and hostility, and most members withdrew from organ- 
ized group activities. Is it accurate to say, then, that the BUPC 
enjoyed a high degree of mutual support? We think it is, but only 
with some clarification. First, despite the quarreling, most 
members had formed strong ties with other believers that were 
not affected by the group's internal disputes. Second, and perhaps 
more important, most believers had strong identities as BUPC 
that transcended their commitment to Doc's prediction. For them 
the faith offered both an all-embracing theodicy and an eminently 
desirable plan for living. While most had been attracted to the 
faith by its apocalyptic orientation, they subsequently acquired 
a firm grounding in a coherent body of Baha'i teachings dating 
back over 100 years. As a result, Doc's followers were able to cope 
with disconfirmation by shifting the focus of their lives away from 
Doc and placing greater emphasis on the fundamentals of the 
BUPC faith. Members of the Lake City group lacked this option 
because their belief in Mrs. Keech's prediction was the sole basis 
for their identity as members. 
Thus Hardyk and Braden's post factum hypotheses appear to 
explain why both the True Word group and the BUPC failed to 
proselyte after disconfirmation. Yet there remains a puzzling 
anomaly in our finding. Doc's followers were severely demoralized 
by disconfirmation, while members of the other two groups pro- 
claimed great victories for their faith. In both the Lake City and 
True Word groups, testimonies and follow-up interviews indicated 
that disconfirmation may have even strengthened belief.6 What 
accounts for the difference? Comparison of the three groups sug- 
gests that the social context in which disconfirmation is exper- 
ienced might be the critical factor determining the reaction to 
prophetic failure. 
In the Festinger study Mrs. Keech and most of her followers 
were together in the same house when disconfirmation occurred. 
Within hours after her prophecy failed Mrs. Keech offered what 
became the group's "official" explanation. The world had been 
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spared from destruction because of their faith. The next day 
members confronted numerous reporters and other visitors who 
came to the house to hear how Mrs. Keech would explain the 
failure of her prediction. 
The situation was very similar in the True Word group. Although 
there were several shelters, each group had a strong leader and 
the shelters were connected by an intercom system that allowed 
the leaders to deal with questions, doubts, and dissent as soon 
as they appeared. We are not told how long it took Mrs. Shepard 
to rationalize the failure of her prophecy, but her explanation 
obviously could have been communicated to all of her followers 
very rapidly. When members of the True Word sect finally emerged 
from their shelters, they also confronted the press as a group, and 
the leaders held an impromptu news conference to explain why 
the attack had not occurred. 
On the other hand, the BUPC experienced isconfirmation as
a widely dispersed collection of small groups that lacked a well- 
thought-out plan for staying in contact with each other. Doc made 
no systematic effort o communicate with his followers immedi- 
ately after disconfirmation, and his explanations - suggested and 
revised over a period of months - were disseminated haphazardly 
by word of mouth. Members never confronted representatives of
the outside world as a group; even in Missoula they did not meet 
again for over two weeks after the 29th. 
What we have here are three groups with enormous material 
and psychological investments in a millennial dream which sud- 
denly collapsed. It is hard to imagine a more ambiguous situa- 
tion than the first uneasy moments after disconfirmation. It is 
a well-established principle that the more ambiguous the situa- 
tion, the greater the demand for information in the form of 
rational explanations and guidelines for behavior, especially when 
the situation has important implications for action (Allport and 
Postman, 1974; Festinger, 1954; Shibutani, 1966; Turner and 
Killian, 1972). In his early theory of social comparison Festinger 
(1954) postulated that there is a basic drive in human beings to 
evaluate their opinions and beliefs. When objective reality checks 
are unavailable, people tend to rely on others as points of reference. 
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Since Doc was the undisputed spiritual authority for the BUPC, 
his followers naturally turned to him for guidance, but he did little 
to fill the void. 
Doc's failure to act decisively and the group's lack of organ- 
ized communication channels conspired to perpetuate the ambi- 
guity caused by prophetic failure. Without the imminence of 
catastrophe to focus their lives, the goal of establishing God's 
Kingdom suddenly seemed remote and the means for achieving 
it unclear. Under those circumstances it is not surprising that the 
membership became demoralized. Small-group studies (e.g., 
Cohen, 1959; Raven and Rietsema, 1956) have demonstrated that 
ambiguous goals and uncertainty about how to achieve them are 
related to personal insecurity, emotional tension, weakened attrac- 
tion to the group, loss of motivation to accomplish collective tasks, 
and declining conformity to group norms. Compared to the Lake 
City and True Word groups, the BUPC experienced the ambiguity 
of disconfirmation for a longer period, and also appeared far more 
discouraged by the failure of their prophecy. Significantly, the Lake 
City believers who were most likely to defect were those who exper- 
ienced disconfirmation alone. Much like; Doc's followers, they had 
to endure the ambiguity of prophetic failure longer than the 
believers who were in the company of Mrs. Keech. 
When Doc finally made a strong pitch for proselyting 17 days 
after April 29, his followers were already demoralized and a pat- 
tern of resignation, withdrawal, and internal conflict had been 
established, so it is easy to understand why they failed to respond. 
Mrs. Keech, on the other hand, immediately provided a clear 
example for the others by calling a reporter to explain what had 
happened. Given the susceptibility to social influence of people 
caught in highly ambiguous situations, it is possible that the 
leader's initial reaction to disconfirmation could determine 
whether or not the group engaged in proselyting regardless of 
social support or public ridicule. 
Not only did the BUPC endure more uncertainty, but they never 
had to confront he press as a group. This is a significant dif- 
ference, because this kind of public meeting is likely to elicit a 
strong reaffirmation of faith. Members are, in effect, on stage 
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in the company of fellow believers before an audience of skep- 
tics, and in that situation they are likely to play the role of believer 
regardless of their real feelings (Balch, 1980). By enacting the role, 
especially before reporters, press photographers, and TV 
cameramen, they are recommitting themselves to their beliefs. 
Except for Doc, none of the BUPC was ever induced to recom- 
mit himself or herself in this manner. 
In conclusion, we believe the data discussed here suggest that 
reactions to disconfirmed prophecy depend on the nature of the 
social situation in which prophetic failure occurs. The example 
of the BUPC reveals the inadequacy of the psychological model 
used by Festinger et al. The theory of cognitive dissonance is 
simply unable to account for the complexities we observed in the 
wake of disconfirmation. 
Although our conclusions are tentative, three hypotheses appear 
to be warranted by the data. First, the more central the predic- 
tion is to one's identity as a believer, the greater the need to con- 
vince others after disconfirmation. Second, members are most 
likely to suffer severe demoralization when their leader fails to 
provide a quick explanation for their predicament and take decisive 
steps to restore the group's integrity. Third, believers who are 
forced to explain the failure of their prediction to nonbelievers 
in public settings are more likely to profess strong convictions 
and attempt o persuade others after disconfirmation. As these 
hypotheses uggest, future research on disconfirmed prophecy 
should explore the nature of the believer's identity as a member, 
the reactions of the group's leadership to prophetic failure, and 
the kind of contact the group has with outsiders immediately after 
disconfirmation. 
NOTES 
1. In this article we follow the definitions of "cult" and "sect" offered by Stark and 
Bainbridge (1979). A sect has a prior tie with another religious organization, while a cult 
is a nonschismatic group that lies outside established religious traditions. A millennial 
movement may be either a cult or a sect. It is a religious group that promises imminent 
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collective salvation for the faithful in an earthy paradise that will rise in the wake of 
apocalyptic destruction brought about by supernatural means (Cohn,- 1970: 15). 
2. This is the group's real name, and members refer to themselves as Baha'is despite 
the fact that the Baha'i Faith disavows any connection with the sect and objects to its 
use of the Baha'i name. At the request of a spokesman for the Baha'i Faith, we have 
used the abbreviation BUPC to prevent confusion. The Baha'i name has been used only 
in connection with the international Baha'i Faith or Baha'i writings that are fundamen- 
tal to both groups. 
3. With few exceptions, Doc's followers are young working-class adults. Typical occu- 
pations in the Missoula group include gardener, mechanic, tree thinner, mill worker, bus 
driver, electrician, printer, and welder. Although a few members hold white-collar posi- 
tions, only two in Missoula could be classified as professionals. Doc's wife, an elder in 
the faith, is also a chiropractor, and another woman is a speech therapist. Overall their 
living standards are quite modest. Most own relatively few material possessions and hardly 
any of them are homeowners. All but a few are in their twenties, and roughly a third 
of the active believers are married. 
4. In fact, the local paper reported that the Soviets did launch a spy satellite on April 
29, but we have been unable to verify the time of day. The caller claimed to have received 
his information "from the Holy Spirit." 
5. Unfortunately, our knowledge of the out-of-state groups is based on just eight inter- 
views. While we have no doubts about the overall direction of the results in these groups, 
the exact numbers are open to question. 
6. We are not entirely convinced by Hardyck and Braden's data. Rather than observing 
the True Word group directly, they relied entirely on after-the-fact interviews, which are 
highly subject to retrospective interpretation a d social desirability effects. Members of 
deviant religious groups often misrepresent their true feelings to outsiders (e.g., Balch, 
1980), and without built-in validity checks, especially direct observation, these distor- 
tions can easily pass unnoticed. In our study of the BUPC we found numberous instances 
where members' recollections of their reactions to disconfirmation did not jibe with our 
observations or the reports of others. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that Hardyck 
and Braden attempted to verify the accuracy of their findings. 
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